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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C 20505

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Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 82-4220

21 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Director, Intelligence Community Staff

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FROM:

, Acting Chairman  
Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

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SUBJECT: International Terrorism (U)

1. In late February 1982, in response to a request from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, you asked the CIPC to review the Intelligence Community's present efforts against the problem of international terrorism and to develop proposals for upgrading this effort as appropriate. The attached study is in response to your request. An interim reply was forwarded to Judge Clark on 13 March 1982 highlighting in summary fashion improvements undertaken in this regard within the last year. [REDACTED]

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2. No issues arose during CIPC deliberations concerning the terrorism problem that were not resolved within the Committee. The publication of NSDD-30, Managing Terrorist Incidents, occurred as we were applying the final touches to the study. In restructuring the paper to reflect the existence of the Directive--which is vague and ambiguous in some respects--the Committee accepted the contents of the Directive at face value. Thus, we may have attributed more potential for good to its existence than will actually be the case over time. To do otherwise, however, would have put us in the position of pre-judging its success. [REDACTED]


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3. You will recall that the CIPC request for agency/departmental representatives for this study used the NFIC mechanism. With your concurrence, copies of the study will be forward to NFIC principals with a short deadline for review and response. This approach should alleviate the need for convening the NFIC for the sole purpose of addressing the paper. (U)

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
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PROPOSALS FOR UPGRADING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS  
DIRECTED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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


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## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

International terrorism, which is both an intelligence and a counterintelligence problem, poses a complex collection and analytic challenge for the Intelligence Community. The numbers and diversity of terrorism groups, the often sporadic nature and transnational flow of terrorist group activities, and the worldwide dispersion of terrorist group operational areas, makes it an elusive target. Because international terrorism is a government-wide problem, it also poses an equally imposing management challenge--one which has grown steadily as the Washington counterterrorism network, particularly the non-intelligence portion of it, has expanded. [ ]

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The individual departments and agencies of the Intelligence Community are better equipped today to address the problem of international terrorism than they were five years ago when the first study of this type was undertaken. This has been a slow process, however, impeded to a considerable degree both by organizational shifts in the Community and by inertia with regard to the management aspects of the problem, the latter fueled by a lack of firm guidance based on a well-defined national counterterrorism policy. The increased priorities accorded the problem since 1979, as well as increases in the threat itself, have fostered organizational shifts that have tended to focus departmental efforts more on international terrorism and paved the way for the direction of additional collection and analytic resources against the problem. Moreover, a wide-ranging series of additional pertinent enhancements, primarily in the collection arena, are presently either under way or planned. [ ]

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Despite these improvements, the Community's overall capabilities with regard to international terrorism remain limited. This is due in large part to the scope and nature of terrorism itself, but also to some extent to the fragmented approach the Community continues to take to the problem. To be sure, collection and analytic problems abound which additional resources, both manpower and dollars, would alleviate. But there are long-standing questions of coordination of effort--both within and outside the Community--that should be resolved first in order to promote improved effectiveness and better use of existing resources against the terrorism problem. The study group's recommendations in this regard are outlined below:

- A. The Development of a Mechanism by Which Reporting From Non-Intelligence Agencies is Routinely Made Available to the Intelligence Community. The Community has spent considerable effort devising ways in which its products can be sanitized for use by non-intelligence elements of the US Government in support of counterterrorism. Many of these elements, in carrying out their operational

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responsibilities, obtain information on international terrorist activities which is not routinely made available to the Community. Some of this information would probably fill gaps in the Community's overall understanding of the problem. Resolution of this problem, should it prove difficult, would be somewhat beyond the control of the Intelligence Community. Until the promulgation on 10 April 1982 of National Security Decision Directive Number 30, which, inter alia, establishes a national-level focal point for handling such organizational issues, there existed no effective, authoritative central mechanism to bring the intelligence and non-intelligence elements of the government together to work out mutually supportive programs such as this. This responsibility apparently now falls within the purview of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism chaired by the Department of State. [REDACTED]

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- B. Establishment of a Community-wide Program to Exchange Intelligence Production Plans on Terrorism. The production of comprehensive studies and assessments of various aspects of the international terrorist threat is essential to provision of a sound and uniform basis for both short-term and long-term US Government decisionmaking in response to and control of the terrorist problem. The CIPC study group believes that the timing is right for establishing a formal program to exchange production plans among Community members. It would provide a focal point for the diverse terrorism-related production activities of the Community but still preserve a healthy level of competitive analysis. Such a program would tend to distribute intelligence production across the Community to reduce unproductive redundancy and create channels for consensus on threat analysis and crisis management. This program should be coordinated by the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism to ensure that production plans are geared to policy-level needs. [REDACTED]
- C. Data Base Development. There is a need for early interagency consideration of the Intelligence Community's overall data base needs with regard to international terrorism and the degree to which these needs can be met by common or shared data base facilities. As Intelligence Community involvement in counterterrorism has grown, and in the absence of any coordinated Community counterterrorism program, there has been a proliferation of computerized data bases on terrorism tailored to support departmental collection and analytic needs. More are under development. These systems are largely incompatible, impacting seriously on data sharing with regard to the terrorism problem. There is general recognition at the working level that considerable benefit could be derived from access to one another's data base, or possibly from a computerized Community data base on terrorism. It is also recognized that important departmental and legal considerations will have to be addressed carefully in order

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to implement this recommendation. [redacted]

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- E. Development of Community Contingency Plans. Little effort has been devoted to the development of Community contingency plans for handling either the collection or analytic aspects of a terrorist event. The Dozier kidnapping pointed up the need for increased interagency coordination in this area. A logical starting point in such an effort would be to assign the DCI's Senior Review Panel the task of doing a post-mortem on the Community's ability to respond to that event, drawing, inter alia, from the various "lessons-learned" studies and reviews undertaken by various departments. [redacted]
- F. Vigorous Follow-Up With Regard to Items A through E. The recent establishment by the DCI of an Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) fills a long-standing need for a Community coordinating body to link together the diverse Community interests concerning international terrorism. It should be the mechanism through which the Community pursues items A through E. A major weakness in past attempts to address similar issues has been lack of follow-up. The Chairman of the IICT should be charged with reporting monthly to the DCI, through the DDCI, concerning progress and problems associated with the above. [redacted]
- G. Elevation of the DCI's Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism to the Status of a Permanent Committee of the National Foreign Intelligence Council. Obtaining Community agreement on a more coordinated approach to the terrorism problem will be difficult. Many equities are involved and, despite being specifically identified in NSDD-30 as the organization responsible for focusing and coordinating interagency intelligence efforts to counter terrorist threats, the Committee will not have the authority to resolve the really "hard" issues. Elevating the IICT's status to a permanent committee of the NFIC will enhance Community focus on the problem, and give Committee efforts visibility at the highest levels of Community management where resolution of the more difficult issues should ultimately take place. [redacted]

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**PROPOSALS FOR UPGRADING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS  
DIRECTED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**

**INTRODUCTION**

In late February 1982, in response to a request from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence asked the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) to review the Intelligence Community's present efforts against the problem of international terrorism and to develop proposals for upgrading these efforts as appropriate. This study responds to that request. It assesses the Community's progress in implementing improvements contained in an earlier study bearing DCI approval, summarizes current strengths and weaknesses in our present ability to support policymaker interests with regard to international terrorism, and recommends specific measures that could be taken to further enhance the Community's ability in this regard. [REDACTED]

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All NFIC principals with the exception of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce were represented in Committee deliberations. The three Collection Offices of the Intelligence Community Staff also participated in the study. [REDACTED]

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**PROGRESS SINCE 1977**

The Intelligence Community has studied the problem of international terrorism in considerable detail over the past five years. The common theme of such efforts has been that, although terrorism poses a complex collection and analytical challenge for the Community, it poses an equally challenging management problem for the US Government--one which has grown steadily as the Washington counterterrorism network has expanded and as Agencies which formerly had no stake in the business of counterterrorism are now very much involved. International terrorism is both a foreign intelligence and a counterintelligence responsibility. It is also an area in which foreign aspects can have direct and serious repercussions in the domestic sphere, especially on matters of concern to US agencies with protective security, law enforcement, or regulatory responsibilities. [REDACTED]

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A baseline study of intelligence activities directed against the terrorism problem was undertaken in 1977 by the DCI's interagency Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC).<sup>\*</sup> It found the Community's effort against international terrorism to be "... a fragmented one, neither tightly organized nor closely coordinated in either its collection or analytical aspects." According to the CCPC study, a more coordinated Community approach would: provide much needed focus to departmental programs; promote better organization of Community resources involved; enable rationalization of the Community's work efforts; yield a better and more useful product at both departmental and national levels; and result in improved and more comprehensive support to US Government efforts to combat international terrorism. [REDACTED]

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Progress toward achievement of these goals over the past five years has been uneven at best, frustrated at the outset by internal Intelligence Community events. Central to the course of action recommended by the CCPC in 1977 was the establishment under the CCPC of an interagency subcommittee on terrorism devoted to addressing the most serious of the weaknesses identified in the study. Though established in 1977, the subcommittee's efforts were cut short by the formation of the National Collection Planning Office (NCPO) in 1978, an element of the then newly reorganized Intelligence Community Staff. The NCPO charter was similar to that of the CCPC and the latter--which then served the DCI through the Collection Tasking Staff element of the IC Staff--was viewed as redundant and soon became moribund. Although it was recommended at the time that the CCPC subcommittee on terrorism be kept intact and report directly to the DCI, deliberations concerning its future were clouded by the delay in formally disestablishing the parent CCPC,<sup>\*\*</sup> and the subcommittee withered from neglect. The NCPO had no dedicated effort directed against the terrorism problem. [REDACTED]

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Factors external to the intelligence process contributed to the inertia induced by the withering of the CCPC subcommittee on terrorism, thus providing a further impediment to the establishment of the desired Community approach to the problem. International terrorism is a government-wide problem. While intelligence support is central to any successful counterterrorism effort, the quality of such support is affected directly by the extent of cooperation and coordination attained with the many non-intelligence elements of the US Government having vested interests in--and the ability to report on--the problem. There was during this period no effective, authoritative, central mechanism to give national direction to an overall counterterrorism program

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\* Intelligence Activities Against International Terrorism, CCPC-D-3/77 June 1977.

\*\* The CCPC was formally disestablished in December 1981. [REDACTED]

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and bring the intelligence and non-intelligence elements of the government together to work out mutually supportive programs. With no one focusing on the management aspects of the problem at the national level, there was little impetus to focus on them at the Community level, particularly prior to 1980 when international terrorism was still a relatively low-priority item for the Intelligence Community. [REDACTED]

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In addition, there was during the period continued focusing of policymaker attention on the crisis management and foreign policy aspects of the terrorism problem almost to the exclusion of consideration of the need for the establishment and maintenance of a credible threat assessment capability. With policymaker attention thus riveted, there developed within the Intelligence Community a perception of a lack of national-level concern with, and policy for, a comprehensive US counter-terrorism program. This perception, coupled with the low priority accorded the terrorism problem until 1979, resulted in limited resources being applied to the problem, and the intelligence effort continued to be largely event-oriented and reactive in nature. As a result, in the absence of a Community focus on the threat assessment aspects of the terrorism problem, Intelligence Community organizations tended to go their individual ways in development of counterterrorism capabilities tailored to support for the most part departmental needs. The scope and nature of terrorism--the numbers and diversity of terrorism groups, the often sporadic nature and transnational flow of terrorist group activities, and the worldwide geographical dispersion of terrorist group operational areas--makes such an unfocused approach against an inherently difficult target less than efficient and effective. [REDACTED]

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Some of the problems identified in the 1977 study have, of course, been tackled successfully. Several legal issues relating to Intelligence Community collection of intelligence information concerning international terrorism identified in the 1977 CCPC study were examined by a panel of representatives from the appropriate departments and agencies. By and large, those issues were based upon ambiguities in the Executive Order and guideline provisions that governed US intelligence activities at that time, as well as the then uncertain application of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. Since that time, there have been two revisions of the Executive Order and its implementing procedures and guidelines, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has been created by law to authorize electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes in the US, the Government's understanding of and ability to deal with the requirements of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts has much improved, and the Classified Information Procedures Act and various agreements and understandings have been developed to regulate the handling and use of intelligence information in law enforcement investigations and proceedings. There are still rough points in existing implementing procedures and these are being considered in the revision process that is now under way. As a consequence of these developments, while the Constitution and relevant statutes impose outside limits on the extent to which the

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Intelligence Community may collect and disseminate information by certain techniques in particular circumstances, legal issues now appear to be of less concern. Many of the legal considerations that were perceived to be impediments have now been resolved and the adverse impact of those that remain seems capable of resolution. [ ]

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In addition, international terrorism assumed a much more prominent place in the DCID 1/2 priorities listing, and since 1979 the priorities accorded the problem increased substantially. Guidance to field collection elements also underwent considerable improvement, and CIA initiated a conscientious effort to reduce to the extent possible the tight controls on clandestinely acquired information in order to provide wider dissemination to non-agency elements concerned with terrorism. Some basic data base improvements also were made. [ ]

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#### PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

National Security Decision Directive Number 30, dated 10 April 1982, in addition to establishing a national-level mechanism for managing individual terrorist incidents, specifically identifies the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Department of State, as the national-level organization responsible for developing overall US policy with regard to international terrorism.\* The IG/T presently consists of representatives from

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Federal agencies with direct responsibility for anti-terrorism programs, including the FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury and Energy, the CIA, the FAA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NSC Staff and the Vice President's office. The IG/T, in its policy development role, will be addressing--inter alia--policy directives, organizational issues, legislative initiatives, and interagency training programs. Moreover, as the primary mechanism within the US Government for planning and policy recommendations regarding terrorism, the IG/T is also charged with ensuring the development of an effective, coordinated interagency exercise program geared to ensure effective management of terrorist incidents. [REDACTED]

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With regard to crisis management, the coordination of federal response to terrorist incidents is the responsibility of that agency with the most direct operational role in dealing with it. The lead agency will normally be either the State Department, the FBI/Justice, or the FAA, depending respectively on whether the incident takes place beyond or within US territory or involves a hijacking within the special jurisdiction of the US. NSDD-30 also establishes the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG). Although the wording in NSDD-30 is vague in some respects with regard to the TIWG, it apparently will be activated under NSC auspices during especially grave incidents to support the Special Situation Group (SSG) when the latter is convened at the direction of the Vice President. The White House Operations Group (WHOG), chaired by the Director of the White House Military Office, will have responsibility for issues relating to threats or acts of terrorism directed against the President, the Vice President, or senior US officials and protectees as directed by the President. [REDACTED]

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Within the Intelligence Community, the DCI recently established an Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) to focus and coordinate Intelligence Community efforts to counter the terrorist threat. Chaired by CIA, the Committee includes representatives from the Department of State, the Secret Service, the FBI, DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force. The chairman has been representing CIA at IG/T sessions and presumably will continue to do so, although this relationship is not identified in NSDD-30. The IICT will also provide intelligence support to the TIWG and the SSG and, presumably, to the WHOG, although the latter relationship may be via either the TIWG or the IG/T. The Committee, cited specifically in NSDD-30 as the element responsible for focusing and coordinating interagency intelligence efforts to counter terrorist threats, is to concentrate on threat alerts, trend assessments, and required procedural improvements within the Community. [REDACTED]

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There have also been unilateral efforts within the Community, particularly among the major intelligence collectors and producers, to better focus individual departmental efforts against international terrorism. For example, within CIA's Directorate of Operations (CIA/DDO), the Counterterrorism Group is being restructured [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The Chief of the Counterterrorism Group is currently [REDACTED]

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Chairman of the aforementioned Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. Similarly, CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (CIA/DDI) has focused its analytic effort in an Instability and Insurgency Center. Plans are now under way to collocate the DDI and DDO elements to optimize the coordination of terrorism-related collection and analysis within CIA. NSA also employs a single organization--to be upgraded to office level--to coordinate its SIGINT efforts against the problem, and DIA has established a dedicated effort, principally to support the multi-service Counter-Terrorist Joint Task Force. The Terrorism Section within the FBI's Criminal Investigation Division orchestrates the Bureau's counterintelligence efforts with regard to international terrorism and provides representatives to pertinent Intelligence Community fora. Efforts elsewhere in the Community are less structured and intense. State/INR currently has one analyst covering international terrorism who draws on the expertise of INR regional analysts. Individual country analysts also follow carefully terrorist activities in their areas of responsibility. In addition, INR has designated a Special Coordinator for Intelligence on International Terrorism who will report to INR's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Assessments and Research. The Services' efforts against the problem focus predominantly on departmental counterintelligence and physical security concerns. The Departments of Treasury and Energy\* are primarily consumers of the Intelligence Community product. [REDACTED]

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The recent establishment by the DCI of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism fills a long-standing need for a Community coordinating body to link together the diverse Community interests concerning international terrorism, and should pave the way for a concerted effort to develop more efficient and effective internal Community operating procedures with regard to the terrorism problem. Until the recent promulgation of NSDD-30, there was considerable potential for Committee deliberations in this regard to have been conducted in a vacuum. The IG/T, which for some time has been the principal national-level organization the Community could look to for specific guidance with regard to its efforts against international terrorism, had no apparent authority prior to NSDD-30 to establish overall government policy or programs relating to the problem that would tie together the intelligence and non-intelligence efforts and provide a baseline against which the Intelligence Community might better structure both its short- and long-term efforts. Thus, until now, the Community, in the absence of any firm direction based on policy, has been left to its own devices to focus its efforts and structure its counterterrorism intelligence support mechanism. With the charter provided the IG/T in NSDD-30, and assuming that there will be a continuing dialogue between IICT and the IG/T, there is now considerable potential for alleviating this situation. [REDACTED]

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Against International Terrorism

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(21 April 1982)

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